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     an Israeli Air Force jet is shot down in international airspace just 
outside Turkish airspace. Imagine further that the Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF) and Israeli intelligence services quickly ascertain with a high level of 
confidence that a Hezbollah cell located in Turkey was responsible for the 
shoot-down. Israel now confronts a difficult question: having suffered an 
armed attack, may it use force in self-defense against a non-state actor in the 
territory of a state with which it is not in an armed conflict and that was not 
the author of the attack? 
In previous work, I have argued that Israel may only take action in 
Turkish territory against Hezbollah if it has Turkish consent or if it deter-
mines that Turkey is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by 
Hezbollah.1 This “unwilling or unable” test, which has analogical roots in 
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the law of neutrality,2 serves as an attempt to balance the security of the 
State that suffered the attack (the “victim State”) against the sovereignty of 
the State from which the non-State actor launched the attack (the “territo-
rial State”). The test also reflects the international community’s interest in 
reducing to the lowest level feasible inter-State conflict (and State uses of 
force in self-defense). 
Imagine now that the IDF learns that its air force’s command and con-
trol center is being severely compromised electronically and has begun to 
send faulty coordinates to all of the IDF’s military aircraft, including those 
currently airborne. As a result of the cyber attack,3 the IDF loses commu-
nications with two of its jets, which crash into the Mediterranean Sea. Israel 
has a high level of confidence that several servers in Turkey are the source 
of the ongoing attack; additionally, the offending code behind the attack 
has Hezbollah’s digital fingerprints on it and Israel has intelligence that 
Hezbollah has been trying for several years to conduct just such an attack. 
Assuming that Israel has the technological capacity to disable the Turkish 
servers currently routing the attack and believes that such an action is the 
only way to stop this attack, may Israel disable those Turkish servers (using 
cyber or kinetic tools)? What, if anything, must it do first? 
This article argues that the “unwilling or unable” test applies to this 
scenario as well, although the issues facing Israel and Turkey in the two 
scenarios are different in important ways. Other scholars have suggested 
that the “unwilling or unable” test is relevant in the cyber context,4 but no 
                                                                                                                      
2. J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 482 (1911) (“[W]here the neutral cannot or 
will not enforce its rights, then the belligerent is fully entitled to prevent the violation 
permitted by the neutral redounding to his disadvantage.”). 
3. This paper uses the phrase “cyber attacks” generically to refer to acts that “alter, 
disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information 
and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks,” TECHNOLOGY, 
POLICY, LAW AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK 
CAPABILITIES 1 (WILLIAM OWENS, KENNETH DAM, & HERBERT LIN, EDS., 2009) [herein-
after OWENS ET AL.]. A particular cyber attack may or may not constitute a use of force or 
armed attack, as those terms are used in the jus ad bellum sense. 
4. See Duncan Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 1023, 1050 (2007) (“International law contemplates that the 
[State injured by information operations] would notify the State from whose territory it 
believes the IO originated and request that State put a stop to it. The requested State is 
expected to comply with such requests . . . . Only if the requested State is unable or unwill-
ing to stop the IO can the aggrieved State take counter-measures (or perhaps exercise a 
right of self-defense against the requested State . . . .”); George Walker, Information Warfare 













scholar has analyzed how a State actually should or would apply that test, 
how the test’s application will differ in the cyber and non-cyber contexts 
and what that divergence teaches us about conflict in the cyber realm. This 
paper addresses those three issues, focusing on situations in which the 
cyber activity rises to the level of a cyber armed attack (rather than cyber 
activities that fall below that threshold). At the same time, it highlights the 
particular importance of State practice in adopting and expounding the use 
of the “unwilling or unable” test in the cyber context. Indeed, news reports 
suggest that the United States is wrestling mightily to determine when it is 
appropriate and lawful to take cyber action outside the boundaries of its 
own networks.5 Establishing State-to-State expectations about what types 
of cyber activities will trigger what types of responses will provide im-
portant incentives for ostensibly neutral States to take steps to protect their 
computer networks while minimizing the likelihood of inter-State misun-
derstandings that lead to unnecessary conflict in the cyber or non-cyber 
realms.6 
Part II describes the “unwilling or unable” test, including relevant fac-
tors that States should use in assessing whether another State has met that 
test. Part III applies those factors to the cyber context. Part IV considers 
how the U.S. government may be approaching these issues. Part V con-
cludes. 
 
II. THE “UNWILLING OR UNABLE” TEST 
 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the United States concluded that 
it was in an international armed conflict with Al Qaeda, a non-State actor. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this claim was the implicit argu-
ment that the United States therefore could use force against members of 
Al Qaeda anywhere they appeared. This concept resulted in the much-
                                                                                                                      
(“The ‘means at a neutral’s disposal’ principle should be the test for a neutral’s duty for 
belligerents’ IW [information warfare] incursions; the neutral should be held to apply 
means at its disposal to detect and repel these incursions. Such being the case, the correla-
tive right of a belligerent aggrieved by IW incursions should be that the belligerent may 
take such actions as are necessary in the territory of a neutral that is unable (or perhaps 
unwilling) to counter enemy IW force activities making unlawful use of that territory, a 
principle from the law of naval warfare.”). 
5. Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Proposes More Robust Role for Its Cyber-Specialists, WASH-
INGTON POST, Aug. 9, 2012. 
6. See OWENS ET AL., supra note 3, at 318 (explaining rationales behind legal regimes 












maligned idea of the “global war on terror.” The United States later took 
care to clarify that its international armed conflict claim did not mean that 
it would use force in all countries in which members of Al Qaeda appeared. 
Rather, the United States asserted that it would only use force in those 
countries that either gave the United States consent to do so or were “un-
willing or unable” to suppress the threat itself.7 Nor is the United States the 
only State to employ the “unwilling or unable” test when evaluating the 
legality of using force against non-State actors in another State’s territory. 
Israel, Russia and Turkey all have cited the test in recent years.8 Scholars, 
too, have described the “unwilling or unable” test as the applicable test in 
this situation,9 though some contest that the test has any status in interna-
tional law.10 
                                                                                                                      
7. John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Address at the 
London School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006); 
Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Address at the Annual Meeting of 
American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010). 
8. See Deeks, supra note 1, at 486–87 (listing other States’ claims). 
9. See, e.g., NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE 
ACTORS 42 (2010) (reciting the “unwilling or unable” test as the correct test for determin-
ing when a victim State may take measures against non-State actors in the territorial State); 
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 217 (3d ed. 2001) (“Extra-
territorial law enforcement is a form of self-defence, and it can be undertaken by Utopia 
against armed bands or terrorists inside Arcadian territory, in response to an armed attack 
unleashed by them from that territory. Utopia is entitled to enforce international law extra-
territorially only when Arcadia is unable or unwilling to prevent repetition of that armed 
attack.”); Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51 
(1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AF-
FAIRS JOURNAL 35, 47 (2003); Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibil-
ity, and the Use of Military Force, 4 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 116 
(2003) (“[S]hould a State be unwilling or unable to prevent its territory from being used as 
a sanctuary or base of operations by a transnational terrorist organization, a State threat-
ened with an imminent attack by such an organization may . . . engage in a self-defense use 
of force to deal with this threat.”); Alberto Coll, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military 
Responses to Terrorism, 81 AMERICAN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 297, 
305 (1987) (“[O]nce it becomes reasonably evident that the harboring State is unable or 
unwilling to act, the injured State should be free to use the minimum of force required to 
stop the terrorist threat.”); Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 712, 732 (1958) (“Military action 
across a frontier to suppress armed bands, which the territorial sovereign is unable or un-
willing to suppress, has been explained in terms of legitimate self-defense on a limited 
number of occasions in the present century.”); Tatiana Waisberg, Colombia’s Use of Force in 
Ecuador Against a Terrorist Organization, 12 ASIL Insights (2008), available at 













Although this test plays a significant role in regulating the geography of 
an armed conflict (or the geographic location of a State’s response to an 
armed attack), its precise substantive and procedural content remains un-
clear. Must the victim State request assistance from the territorial State be-
fore using force against the non-State actor in the territorial State? By what 
standards should the victim State evaluate the territorial State’s proposed 
means to address the threat and its capacity to do so? In the context of an 
armed conflict, what level of threat justifies taking action, using the “un-
willing or unable” theory? International law currently does not answer 
these questions. 
As complicated as an “unwilling or unable” inquiry may be in the non-
cyber context, it becomes even more complicated in the cyber context. 
First, it is far easier to employ the cyber infrastructure of third States for 
hostile ends than it is to employ the physical territory of those States to 
commit conventional hostile acts. States and non-State actors that are en-
gaged in armed conflicts or that are intent on committing armed attacks 
tend to operate from a single State or from a limited number of States, by 
virtue of cost, politics, logistics and terrain. In contrast, those same States 
and non-State actors are able to employ the cyber infrastructure of a much 
larger number of third States in forcible pursuit of their goals. Second, the 
difficulty of attribution in the cyber context is well-known.11 As a result, 
there will be many situations in which the victim State can ascertain that a 
third country’s servers are being used for hostile purposes but be unable to 
identify with certainty the actual authors of the attacks. In some cases, the 
victim State may not even be able to identify the geographic origin of a giv-
en cyber attack.12 This stands in contrast to kinetic activities outside the 
cyber context, where the victim State often is able to identify the authors of 
the armed attacks and their locations, using well-established intelligence 
and investigatory resources. Third, the increased anonymity of cyberspace 
                                                                                                                      
actions after the September 11 attacks may, however, indicate a trend toward recognizing 
that a State that suffers large-scale violence perpetrated by non-State actors located in an-
other State has a right to use force in self-defense when . . . that other State proves unwill-
ing or unable to reduce or eliminate the source of the violence.”). 
10. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Unwilling or Unable Standard for Self-Defense, OPINIO JURIS, 
(Sept. 17, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/17/the-unwilling-or-unable-standard-
for-self-defense-against-non-State-actors/ (rejecting “unwilling or unable” test as custom-
ary international law on basis that there is insufficient State practice and evidence of opinio 
juris). 
11. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Vulnerability, NEW REPUBLIC (June 7, 2010). 












may mean growth in the number of actors that seek to use cyber attacks. 
The deterrence that accompanies the fear of getting caught is reduced be-
cause the chance of being held accountable is lower. 
Before turning to the cyber scenarios in which a State will need to em-
ploy the “unwilling or unable” test, however, it is important to clarify sev-
eral assumptions in this article. First, this piece assumes that cyber attacks 
that produce effects similar to those of kinetic military actions will consti-
tute “armed attacks” that trigger the victim State’s right of self-defense.13 
Second, it assumes that non-State actors may be authors of armed attacks, 
even when those attacks are not attributable to a State.14 Third, it assumes 
that, in the context of an international armed conflict, it would not violate 
the law of neutrality for a neutral State to allow a belligerent State to use, or 
not prevent it from using, its public internet and communications networks 
as a conduit for a cyber attack.15 It assumes, however, that neutrality law 
would prohibit a neutral State from allowing a State or non-State actor to 
use its tangible computer equipment or operating systems, including serv-
ers, to host those attacks.16 This means that a victim State, in responding to 
                                                                                                                      
13. See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International 
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
885, 929 (1998–99) (discussing possibility that computer network attacks could constitute 
“armed attacks”); Nils Melzer, Cyberwarfare and International Law 13, UNIDIR Resources 
(2011) (stating that cyber operations have the qualitative capacity to qualify as an armed 
attack within the meaning of UN Charter Article 51). 
14. See Deeks, supra note 1, at 492–93 (describing three schools of thought on this 
question). 
15. This follows from Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers and Persons during War on Land, art. 8. Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 
Bevans 654 [hereinafter Hague V], which States that a neutral power is not required to 
“forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or 
of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private individuals.” 
16. Id. Allowing particular servers within the neutral State to host attacks is more 
closely akin to allowing a belligerent to move munitions of war across neutral territory or 
furnishing military supplies to a belligerent, which Hague V would prohibit. This seems to 
be the approach taken by the U.S. Department of Defense in 1999 in its Assessment of 
International Legal Issues in Information Operations. That document provides, “[U]se of 
a nation’s communications networks as a conduit for an electronic attack would not be a 
violation of its sovereignty . . . . A transited State would have somewhat more right to 
complain if the attacking State obtained unauthorized entry into its computer systems as 
part of the communications path to the target computer. It would be even more offended 
if malicious logic directed against a target computer had some harmful effect against the 
transited State’s own equipment, operating systems, or data.” See also TALLINN MANUAL, 













a cyber armed attack against it, would not violate Article 2(4) simply by di-
recting its response through a third State’s public communications chan-
nels. The victim State would trigger Article 2(4), however, if it damaged a 
server hosted in that third State.17 Fourth, it assumes that the victim State 
will be able to direct its response in a manner consistent with both the jus 
ad bellum and the laws of armed conflict, including the principles of distinc-
tion and proportionality.18 Finally, it assumes that, as a matter of policy, the 
victim State will conduct its responses to a cyber armed attack in the cyber 
realm, although there is no legal requirement that it do so.19 
There are at least three scenarios in which a State that has suffered a 
cyber attack may seek to take responsive (forcible) action in a third State’s 
territory and therefore will need to assess the third State’s willingness and 
ability to take action to address that cyber attack. First, a State may be 
fighting another State in an international armed conflict, where the State’s 
opponent has launched a cyber attack from a third State’s territory. In in-
ternational armed conflict, the laws of neutrality apply. Assuming that the 
third State is neutral in the international armed conflict, the laws of neutral-
ity require the neutral State to prevent its territory from being used by a 
belligerent as a place from which to launch attacks.20 If a belligerent never-
theless is initiating or conducting cyber attacks against another belligerent 
using the cyber infrastructure of a neutral State, the neutral State must 
                                                                                                                      
Cyber Conflict, 35 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 815, 826–27 (2012) (arguing 
that the law of neutrality would require a neutral State to prevent a belligerent from initiat-
ing or facilitating an attack within neutral territory, but not to prevent the mere passage of 
malware or malicious code over its public cyber infrastructure); Melzer, supra note 13, at 
20 (reasoning that neutral States can be expected to prevent belligerents from conducting 
“cyber hostilities” from within neutral territory but not the “routing of belligerent cyber 
operations through their publicly accessible communications infra-structure”); but see Da-
vis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in 
Armed Conflict, 47 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 179, 210 (2006) (arguing that 
even allowing the transit of malicious code over a State’s public internet infrastructure 
would violate that State’s neutrality obligations). 
17. Such an act would be akin to severing a telephone wire in a State, interrupting 
general telecommunications in that State.  
18. Whether this requires the victim State to identify with certainty the nature and 
identity of the cyber attacker is not clear. 
19. The U.S. cyber security strategy preserves the right to respond kinetically to a 
cyber armed attack. However, given the level of caution with which the U.S. government 
seems to be proceeding in crafting doctrine for cyber responses, it seems reasonable to 
assume that using kinetic force against a cyber armed attack, particularly in a third State’s 
territory, would occur only in an extreme case. 












make efforts to terminate that use. If the neutral State is unwilling or una-
ble to stop that belligerent, the belligerent’s opponent may take forcible 
measures within the neutral State to do so.21 
Second, a State may be in a non-international armed conflict, fighting 
against a non-State actor whose operations are primarily based either within 
that State or within a foreign State’s territory. The non-State actor may un-
dertake cyber actions during that conflict that utilize systems located in for-
eign States. In this case, one may reason by analogy to the law of neutrality 
to assert that the State fighting the non-international armed conflict may 
take measures in that foreign State to suppress the non-State actor’s cyber 
attacks where the foreign State is unwilling or unable to do so itself.22 The 
United States appears to believe that this is the appropriate test to apply in 
the context of kinetic armed conflicts against non-State actors that trans-
cend a single State’s borders.23 It is not clear whether a victim State could 
respond forcibly to any cyber uses of force emanating from the third State, 
or if the victim State only could respond forcibly to those cyber uses of 
force that rise to the level of a cyber armed attack.24 
                                                                                                                      
21. See SPAIGHT, supra note 2, at 482; John Norton Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Deci-
sion to Intercede in Cambodia, 65 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 38, 51 
(1971) (“It is well established in customary international law that a belligerent Power may 
take action to end serious violations of neutral territory by an opposing belligerent when 
the neutral Power is unable to prevent belligerent use of its territory . . . .”); TALLINN 
MANUAL, supra note 16, at Rule 94. 
22. Melzer, supra note 13, at 21 (“Strictly speaking, the law of neutrality applies only in 
international armed conflict. Arguably, however, the pragmatic logic of its core principles 
has already found its way into the practice of non-international armed conflicts as well.”); 
International Committee of the Red Cross Official Statement of 8 March 2001 to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Global Consultations on International 
Protection (“It is the ICRC’s view that [Hague Convention V] can also be applied by anal-
ogy in situations of non-international armed conflicts, in which combatants either from 
the government side or from armed opposition groups have fled into a neutral State.”). 
23. Koh, supra note 7; John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Securi-
ty and Counterterrorism, Address at Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by 
Adhering to Our Values (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-
values-an. 
24. The United States generally asserts that virtually all uses of force constitute armed 
attacks that trigger a State’s right of self-defense. See William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the 
Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295, 299 (2004) (re-
jecting idea that attacks must rise to certain level of severity in order to qualify as armed 
attacks). Many States disagree with that position, however, and thus would have to con-













Third, a State that is not fighting an ongoing non-international armed 
conflict nevertheless may suffer a cyber armed attack from a non-State ac-
tor (or face an imminent threat thereof). This armed attack would trigger 
the victim State’s right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter.25 The victim State would then have to assess whether it was necessary 
to use force in self-defense against that non-State actor and, secondarily, 
whether it was necessary to use force in that particular foreign State against 
that non-State actor. If the territorial State is both willing and able to sup-
press the threat posed by that actor, it would not be necessary (and there-
fore would not be lawful) for the victim State to use force within the terri-
torial’s borders. 
In each of these three scenarios, the victim State will be required to ex-
amine whether the territorial State can and will take action to halt or miti-
gate the attacks affecting the victim State. Although the test itself has trac-
tion in international law, its lack of substantive and procedural content 
makes it harder to apply and less legitimate as a restraining force in interna-
tional relations. I previously suggested five principles, drawn from histori-
cal practice, that would help guide the test’s application. These principles 
include the requirements that the victim State (1) prioritize cooperation or 
consent with the territorial State, rather than unilateral use of force; (2) ask 
the territorial State to address the threat and give it adequate time to re-
spond; (3) reasonably assess the territorial State’s capacity and control with-
in the relevant region; (4) reasonably asses the territorial State’s proposed 
                                                                                                                      
State actor extraterritorially. Those States might conclude that, absent an armed attack that 
triggers Article 51, the States cannot take any action in response that would violate Article 
2(4) of the Charter. In practice, the United States actually may be imposing policy con-
straints on itself that bring it closer to that position. In his Harvard speech, John Brennan 
noted that “[b]ecause we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the United 
States takes the legal position that . . . we have the authority to take action against al-
Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-defense analysis each time.” 
However, he also stated, “In practice, the U.S. approach to targeting in the conflict with 
al-Qa’ida is far more aligned with our allies’ approach than many assume. This Administra-
tion’s counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those indi-
viduals who are a threat to the United States, whose removal would cause a significant – 
even if only temporary – disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa’ida and its asso-
ciated forces. Practically speaking, then, the question turns principally on how you define 
‘imminence.’” Brennan, supra note 23. 
25. In the context of scenarios 2 and 3, “any action taken against [non-State actors] 
may raise issues about violating the sovereignty of that nation and its rights and obliga-
tions with respect to terrorist operations from or through its territory.” OWENS ET AL., 












means to suppress the threat; and (5) evaluate its prior interactions with the 
territorial State. Part III takes up these factors and applies them in the con-
text of cyber attacks. 
 
III. APPLYING THE TEST’S FACTORS TO CYBER ATTACKS 
 
A. Preference for consent or cooperation 
 
In the ideal situation, a victim State will approach the territorial State and 
inform the latter of the fact of the imminent or actual armed attack and its 
reasons for believing that the attacker is employing the victim State’s infra-
structure to commit the attacks. It then will seek consent to take action 
(whether forcible or not) to suppress the attacks emanating from the terri-
torial State’s computer systems. When it acts pursuant to and consistent 
with that consent, the victim State will not violate Article 2(4) of the Char-
ter or the customary principle of non-intervention. Examples of such con-
sent are not hard to find, particularly outside the cyber realm: Iraq previ-
ously allowed Turkey to use force in Iraq against a Kurdish terrorist group 
(the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), and the United States reportedly is using 
force in Somalia and Yemen against members of Al Qaeda and associated 
forces with the consent of those governments.26 Even if the territorial State 
is reluctant to let the victim State operate alone in its computer systems, 
there may well be opportunities for the two States to work cooperatively to 
suppress the threat. 
This approach has several advantages. First, it minimizes the chance of 
cyber clashes between the victim and territorial States, and reduces the like-
lihood that those States find themselves working at cross-purposes against 
the cyber attacker. Second, this type of cooperation has the potential to 
enhance the victim State’s own operations, to the extent that the territorial 
State has a deeper knowledge of its own computer systems, relationships 
with private sector companies whose computers the attacker may be using 
to facilitate the attack, and relevant information about past penetrations 
into the victim (or territorial) State’s systems. Third, this cooperation and 
the corresponding information that it receives from the territorial State 
may help the victim State limit the collateral damage from its response, a 
                                                                                                                      
26. Scott Shane, Yemen Sets Terms of a War on Al Qaeda, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2010, at 1; U.S. Department of State Cable 09 NAIROBI 1057 (“Somalia TFG Prime 













constant concern in the cyber context.27 The advantages of cooperation 
here may be more modest than in the more traditional context in which 
non-State actors conduct physical attacks against the victim State, however. 
In that context, local knowledge about terrain, terrorist camp locations and 
politics may prove particularly helpful in addressing the kinetic threats 
posed by terrorist or rebel groups. One disadvantage to obtaining consent 
or cooperation is temporal: in many cyber cases, a State may need (or wish) 
to respond to an ongoing attack immediately, leaving no time to seek a co-
operative approach with the territorial State. One way to mitigate this tem-
poral concern, while also promoting cooperation between the territorial 
and victim States, would be to negotiate consent agreements in advance.28 
In these agreements, the territorial State could provide advance consent to 
victim State operations in the former’s cyber networks when certain trig-
gers are met. 
At the same time, the anonymity of cyber activity and the ease with 
which an actor may cover his tracks may reduce the victim State’s overall 
incentives to seek any type of consent or cooperation from the territorial 
State before penetrating its cyber systems. In the cyber context, the victim 
State’s actions in redress are less likely to come to light and, even if they do, 
it is easy for the victim State credibly to deny that it was the actual actor in 
that case.29 In the non-cyber context, it is difficult (though not impossible) 
for a victim State physically to penetrate and use force in a territorial State 
without being detected. For example, an international investigation into the 
Cheonan incident (in which North Korea torpedoed a South Korean Navy 
ship) readily revealed Korean markings on the torpedo fragments.30 In ad-
dition, the territorial State may be reluctant to cooperate with the host State 
                                                                                                                      
27. See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 5 (discussing U.S. concerns that actions in another 
country’s networks could result in unintended consequences, including the disruption of 
civilian networks). 
28. By way of precedent, the United States has negotiated a number of bilateral 
agreements relating to operations and ship-boarding to suppress the movement of narcot-
ics and weapons of mass destruction. The latter set of agreements provides advance con-
sent for either party to board a vessel flagged to the other party if the vessel is suspected 
of carrying illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction. See, e.g., Emma L. Belcher, 
The Proliferation Security Initiative: Lessons for Using Nonbinding Agreements, COUNCIL ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS SPECIAL REPORT (July 2011).  
29. See OWENS ET AL., supra note 3, at 81 (noting that most cyber attacks are inhe-
rently deniable). 
30. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United 












for national security reasons, particularly where the territorial State does 
not want to disclose information about its networks, systems and technol-
ogy. 
From a legal perspective, obtaining consent is an ideal way to avoid 
having to answer the host of difficult legal questions that currently attach 
to offensive and defensive uses of cyber tools. Action pursuant to consent 
also makes it less important that the victim State have a firm sense of who 
the author of the attacks is, because the territorial State is less likely to chal-
lenge the victim State’s actions. From a political and military perspective, 
however, the costs of acting without seeking territorial State consent ap-
pear far lower than in the non-cyber context. 
 
B. Request to address the cyber attack 
 
Assume that the territorial State has not affirmatively consented to the vic-
tim State’s use of cyber (or kinetic) tools to suppress the cyber threat ema-
nating from the territorial State, perhaps because it is concerned about al-
lowing the victim State to access its computer networks. At this point, the 
most direct way for a victim State to assess the territorial State’s willingness 
and ability is to ask it to terminate the threat. Not only will this clearly put 
the territorial State on notice of the cyber attack, but it also will place an 
onus on the victim State to share relevant intelligence about the attack. If 
the territorial State responds by providing a plan for suppressing the attack, 
the victim State then has the basic information it needs to begin to assess 
the territorial State’s willingness and ability to act.  
Governments almost certainly will demand a caveat to this require-
ment, however. Where the victim State believes that the territorial State is 
colluding with the author of the cyber attack or will tip off the cyber at-
tacker, the victim State should not be obligated to ask the territorial State 
before taking measures in the territorial State. This is a serious concern 
with States such as Russia and China, which are reported to use civilian 
proxies to conduct cyber attacks.31 It is a particular concern in the cyber 
context because a hostile actor tipped off by the territorial State easily may 
divert its attacks through a different third State. Doing so in the non-cyber 
context takes time and money and poses significant logistical challenges. 
                                                                                                                      
31. Paul Rosenzweig, From Worms to Cyber War, DEFINING IDEAS, Dec. 9, 2011, 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/102401 (describing Russian 
“cyber patriots”); David E. Sanger, John Markoff & Thom Shanker, U.S. Plans Attack and 













Creating too robust a caveat to the requirement to request assistance, how-
ever, will erode the balance that the “unwilling or unable” test strikes by 
putting a heavy finger on the scales in favor of security over sovereignty. 
Even where the victim State is not concerned about a link between the 
territorial State and the hostile cyber actors, this factor magnifies complica-
tions that already exist in the non-cyber context. For the victim State, a re-
quirement that it inform the territorial State about the cyber attacks it is 
suffering is not onerous. However, if the territorial State seeks additional 
information about those attacks—Are you sure they are coming from our 
territory? How do you know? What cyber tools do you have that can detect 
that, and how reliable are they?—the victim State may be hesitant to reveal 
its technological capacities.32 Consider the territorial State’s point of view as 
well. If the victim State simply asks it to suppress the threat, without seek-
ing information about how the territorial State will do so, the territorial 
State may willingly comply, without having to reveal its cyber tools to the 
victim State. If the victim State seeks technological details about how the 
territorial State plans to proceed (which it reasonably might do to assure 
itself that the attacks will stop), the territorial State may be loath to reveal 
those details.33 In the non-cyber context, it is far more likely that States will 
have adequate intelligence about each other’s military hardware and capa-
bilities. In the cyber context, the political relationship between the victim 
and territorial States—and, concomitantly, their willingness to share intelli-
gence and technology—becomes highly predictive of how the victim State 
will proceed. 
 
C. Good faith assessment of territorial State control and capacity 
 
In the non-cyber world, when analyzing a territorial State’s ability to sup-
press the threat, a victim State should assess what level of control the terri-
torial State has over the geographic area from which the attacks are ema-
nating. Conventional attacks plotted and launched from within a capital 
city may be far easier to detect, locate and suppress than attacks launched 
from remote jungles far from any town. A related question goes to the ca-
pacity of the territorial State’s law enforcement and military officers, and 
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whether there are any reasons that those actors would not be able (or will-
ing) to act against the non-State actors. In the cyber context, the question 
becomes how technologically sophisticated is the territorial State? While it 
is possible that one or more hostile actors is physically present in the terri-
torial State, it is more likely that those committing cyber attacks against the 
victim State are present only electronically in the territorial State. Stopping 
those attacks, therefore, depends both on the capacity of the territorial 
State’s cyber gurus and on the attacker’s level of technical sophistication. 
There is not enough publicly available information to gauge how often 
a victim State is likely to encounter a territorial State that is technically una-
ble to defeat a cyber attack against the victim State. Some reports suggest 
that cyber is the great equalizer, allowing States with far weaker conven-
tional militaries to take on those with traditionally strong conventional mili-
taries.34 Others assert that the cyber capacities of States such as the United 
States, Russia and China far exceed those of most other States.35 Putting 
aside the objective capabilities of a particular territorial State, the secondary 
question of how much the victim State knows about the territorial State’s 
capabilities remains a tricky one as long as cyber-capacities remain closely-
held secrets. Publications such as Jane’s Defence Weekly (as well as a State’s 
domestic intelligence reports and the fact that States such as the United 
States may have provided weapons and training to the territorial State in 
question) make it relatively easy to ascertain what a State’s kinetic capabili-
ties are. In the cyber context, though, it will be particularly challenging for a 
victim State to assess the control and capacity of another State with which 
it does not have a close relationship already. 
 
D. Good faith assessment of the territorial State’s proposed means to suppress threat 
 
Closely related to an assessment of the territorial State’s capacity and con-
trol is a good faith assessment of the proposed means by which the territo-
rial State will suppress the threat. The victim State must assess those pro-
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posed actions objectively. Even if the victim State would prefer to act itself, 
it should accept the territorial State’s proposed approach if a “reasonable 
State” would believe that the approach will accomplish the victim State’s 
core goal of suppressing the attack or threat of imminent attack. 
In the non-cyber context, weeks may elapse between the time a territo-
rial State proffers an operational plan and the time it executes it. In con-
trast, there will be almost immediate feedback on the success or failure of 
the territorial State’s efforts to suppress the cyber threat. This makes it 
even more reasonable to defer to the territorial State’s plan in the first in-
stance, unless the ongoing attack against the victim State is so significant 
that there is no time for trial and error. 
Establishing a preference for the territorial State’s proposal is not with-
out costs. Assume the territorial State proposes simply to shut off the serv-
er that is hosting the attacks against the victim State. Assume further that, 
if the territorial State permitted the victim State to address the threat itself, 
the victim State could stop the attack in a way that would allow it to con-
tinue to gather intelligence about the attacker. Should we continue to favor 
the territorial State’s reasonable plan, even where doing so may force the 
victim State to lose some modicum of intelligence about its attacker? Prob-
ably so, though reasonable minds may disagree. What if the territorial 
State’s plan is reasonable but is likely to result in some level of collateral 
damage, while the victim State has a high level of certainty that its plan 
would produce no such damage? In that case, the victim State would have 
at least a credible argument that the territorial State was “unable” to sup-
press the threat in a responsible way. Difficult questions such as these 
abound. 
 
E. Prior interactions with the territorial State 
 
Finally, in assessing the territorial State’s proposed means to address the 
threat itself, the victim State should consider past interactions with the ter-
ritorial State. Has the territorial State previously suppressed threats (con-
ventional or cyber) emanating from its territory? Has the territorial State 
revealed a level of technical competence in the past that should give the 
victim State comfort that its proposed approach will work this time? Is the 
territorial State one from which cyber attacks consistently emanate, or is 
this an unusual incident? The more historically reliable and responsive the 












es to take action itself, and the more difficult it will be for the victim State 
to defend its actions if they come to light. 
 
IV. ADVANCING CYBER LAW? 
 
The United States has asserted that it will treat hostile acts in cyberspace as 
it would “any other threat to our country” and that it reserves the right to 
employ a military response, “as appropriate and consistent with applicable 
international law.”36 In other statements, the United States has made clear 
that in the non-cyber context, international law allows the United States to 
use force against non-State actors in another State’s territory only when the 
territorial State has consented or is unwilling or unable to suppress the 
threat.37 This—coupled with multiple news reports about internal debates 
within the U.S. government on cyber questions38—suggests that the United 
States is attempting to reason by analogy from existing international law 
governing the jus ad bellum. These reports also suggest that the United 
States is attempting to craft appropriate, and apparently highly restrictive, 
operational rules of the road in the cyber sphere. One news report stated 
that U.S. officials are focused on “concerns that action in another country’s 
networks could violate international law, upset allies or result in unintended 
consequences, such as the disruption of civilian networks.”39 The article 
further reported that the U.S. Department of Defense has developed “strict 
conditions governing when military cyber-specialists could take action out-
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side U.S. networks” and that those conditions “are so stringent that the 
new capability to go outside military boundaries might never be used.”40 
In some ways this U.S. process is puzzling. In the face of such legal and 
technological uncertainty, one might expect a country with extensive cyber 
capabilities to take a minimalist approach to legal compliance, at least until 
the international community formulated certain common understandings 
about how to approach cyber warfare. Indeed, in the non-cyber context, 
the U.S. Government has done less hand wringing about using force extra-
territorially, even though the manifestation of that force is far more public. 
Why is the United States working so hard to find the law and apply it in the 
cyber realm, where violations of Article 2(4) would be both legally uncer-
tain and difficult to detect? 
There are at least five factors that may explain why the United States 
has been edging cautiously toward a relatively constraining legal regime 
(one that in all likelihood will be a unilateral approach for some time to 
come). First, there often is an inherent institutional instinct in the U.S. gov-
ernment to anchor novel legal situations in existing bodies of law and prac-
tice, and to reason by analogy. This is, after all, the approach the Obama 
administration took toward detainee habeas cases.41 There, the government 
determines (and asks courts to affirm) that someone is a combatant based 
on functional analogies between that person’s activities and the activities of 
a member of a State’s armed forces. Particularly where the analogies are 
quite reasonable (as they are between kinetic and cyber activities), it often is 
easier to draw from existing rules than to craft new ones from whole cloth. 
Additionally, U.S. government lawyers know that other governments are 
                                                                                                                      
40. Id. (noting that shutting down a server in another country likely would require 
Presidential permission). See also David Sanger, John Markoff & Thom Shanker, U.S. Steps 
Up Effort on Digital Defenses, New York TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009 (stating that President Bush 
personally authorized penetration by the U.S. military of a computer in Iraq to lure Al 
Qaeda members into an ambush); Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Considers Preemptive Strikes as 
Part of Cyber-Defense Strategy, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 28, 2010 (reporting on internal U.S. 
government debate about when the United States may go into foreign cyberspace and take 
preemptive action). 
41. Respondent’s Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re: Guantanamo Bay Litigation, Mar. 
13, 2010 (stating that the President has the authority under the 2001 Authorization for Use 
of Military Force to detain those persons whose relationship to Al Qaeda or the Taliban 
would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed con-












likely to use those existing rules as a starting point from which to evaluate 
U.S. action.42 
As a related matter, the U.S. culture surrounding the use of force and 
the conduct of armed conflicts has grown increasingly legalistic in the past 
ten years. While the United States always has been conscious of the legal 
role that the UN Charter plays in regulating uses of force, the past decade 
has found lawyers playing a particularly prominent role in structuring gov-
ernment decision making in this area.43 A robust interagency process within 
the National Security Council ensures a forum for voices (such as those 
from the State Department) that are concerned about the diplomatic and 
reputational impacts of cyber activities that are seen as unlawful or illegiti-
mate. And a perennial interest in being seen as following the rule of law 
renders unappealing an approach that ignores legal constraints entirely.44 
Third, the United States is keenly aware of the ongoing controversy 
about its geographic approach to the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda and asso-
ciated forces.45 The notion that the United States takes a forward-leaning 
approach to using force in third States with which it is not in conflict re-
mains uncomfortable and legally contentious for many States. It follows 
that the United States would be similarly attuned to the far greater number 
of States that may (advertently or inadvertently) host cyber attacks against 
it, and to the almost-certain controversies that would follow from its uses 
of cyber (or kinetic) force in those States, absent a robust and well-
articulated legal defense of those actions. Developing cautious standards 
through a cautious process is one way to establish that defense and to place 
other States on notice of its contents. 
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Even assuming these three propositions are true, this does not explain 
why the United States has not chosen to adopt freedom of action in cyber-
space—at least for now, while the law is very unclear and it remains diffi-
cult to attribute a particular cyber action to any particular actor. That is, if 
the United States felt that it were justified in responding to a particular in-
coming attack—even one with origins in a friendly and technologically ad-
vanced State—why would it not simply respond to the attack in that 
friendly State and then deny knowledge of the response? One answer 
seems to lie in concerns about cyber collateral damage.46 Past efforts to 
dismantle particular websites have resulted in unexpected disruptions of 
servers in various countries. For instance, when the U.S. military disman-
tled a Saudi web site in 2008, it inadvertently disrupted over 300 servers, 
including in Texas, Saudi Arabia and Germany.47 The high likelihood of 
collateral damage (and the concomitant likelihood that such damage be-
comes public) may place significant pressure on a country such as the Unit-
ed States to set a prudentially high bar for using cyber force in other States’ 
territories.48 
Finally, reciprocity concerns echo loudly in the ears of U.S. policy-
makers and lawyers. Even though the United States rarely will find itself 
being accused by other States of being unwilling or unable to suppress a 
particular cyber threat, the United States should be interested in prioritizing 
consent wherever possible, to create an expectation that other States af-
fected by cyber attacks emanating from the United States will approach the 
U.S. government in the first instance, before taking unilateral action against 
U.S. cyber infrastructure.49 This is particularly true because the United 
States is viewed as a major source of cyber attacks, cyber exploitations and 
botnets.50 It is not in the U.S. interest to allow other States to claim that 
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there is a legal black hole regarding cyber uses of force or to be able to 





The “unwilling or unable” test remains a relevant proposition when a vic-
tim State suffers a cyber armed attack that is launched from the territory of 
a non-hostile State. Depending on the kinds of cyber activities that States 
treat as violating a neutral State’s obligations and those that they treat as 
rising to the level of an armed attack, the international community will em-
ploy the test more or less frequently. The nature of cyber attacks—
including the speed at which they occur—places pressure on the victim 
State to conduct both a rapid and accurate assessment of the territorial 
State’s capabilities and political disposition. Cyber attacks also place pres-
sure on the territorial State to reveal some of its technological capacity if it 
wishes to avoid having the victim State act in its stead. The relationship 
between the territorial and victim States will play an outsized role in the 
outcome of the “unwilling or unable” inquiry. Yet this inquiry stands be-
tween the victim State and a “global cyberwar on terror,” and must be tak-
en seriously. 
 
